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ABSTRACT: The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), according to which two objects are identical if they share all the same properties, has come in for much criticism. Michael Della Rocca has recently defended PII on the grounds that it is needed to forestall the possibility that where there appears to be only one object present, there is actually a multiplicity of exactly-overlapping such objects. Katherine Hawley has criticized this approach for violating a plausible “ground rule” in applying rules of indiscernibility to questions of identity: where there is putative duplication, it must be qualitatively significant. Hawley further suggests that with this rule in hand, one can tell the difference between the presence of one and two indiscernible objects without recourse to either PII or brute, nonqualitative individuation. In this paper, I critically examine Hawley’s contention and find that her appeal to “qualitatively significant duplication” fails since its application to distinct indiscernibles involves a difference that is primarily quantitative anyway. The upshot is a different proposed set of “ground rules” for applying the criterion of qualitative difference when seeking a grounding or explanation for distinctness and identity. 


What do we need a Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) for? One possible motivation, and perhaps the central one, for establishing the truth of a PII is that it would make identity facts grounded in qualitative facts, rather than being brute and primitive. This is because whatever scope it takes would apply to just those properties that, as one might put it, count toward an entity’s identity. Qualitative properties could be said to count towards something’s identity in a way analogous to which differences in qualitative properties are commonly thought to be sufficient to adjudge distinctness and nonidentity, according to PII’s converse, Leibniz’s Law (which has been described as “uncontroversial” (Hawthorne 2003, 106)). Thus, being able to affirm PII would helpfully round out a theory according to which identity facts, just as distinctness facts, are noncircularly grounded in qualitative facts. Yet, PII seems to run immediately into a cardinal difficulty, as shown by the apparent conceivability of distinct indiscernibles (as discussed in the much-cited Black (1952)). 
Many have taken Black’s posited possible world of two indiscernible spheres to effectively undermine PII. But Michael Della Rocca (2005) has recently suggested an important motivation for holding to the Principle. The thought goes like this: one would want to say that while objects can be discerned from one another on the basis of their incomplete overlap, complete spatial overlap makes for just one object (of a certain kind, at least). Yet without PII, Della Rocca contends, one will be hard-pressed to appeal to any independent principle that explains why incomplete overlap allows for there being two distinct objects, yet complete overlap does not. Thus, without PII, one is left without the most obvious principle that would rule out the possibility of there being indiscernible distinct things of the same kind occupying exactly the same space: if I have apparently one sphere before me, who is to say that there is not, in fact, say, twenty of them there?
Katherine Hawley (2009) resists the claim that PII is indispensable for the grounding of identity facts; her contention seems to be that the multiplication of overlapping objects that Della Rocca posits is unmotivated anyway. To Della Rocca’s above-mentioned challenge, Hawley suggests that it violates a plausible “ground rule”: for indefinitely many exactly overlapping objects, “the qualitative arrangement...is constant. Putative counterexamples to PII must involve qualitatively significant duplication, so that it makes a qualitative difference how many of the supposedly indiscernible objects there are.” (Ibid., 105) “Qualitatively significant duplication” is, for Hawley, what makes the difference between one sphere and two spheres in Black’s world: “the sum of the ‘two’ spheres has twice the mass and twice the spatial extension of either individual sphere, and moreover it is not itself spherical.” (Ibid., 105) The case of exactly-overlapping objects that Della Rocca posits is not one of qualitatively significant duplication, but as Hawley urges, in cases where there is qualitatively significant duplication, we can in fact make judgments on a qualitative basis alone to tell the difference between the one-sphere and two-sphere states of affairs. So the lesson is supposed to be that independently of a commitment to a PII, one can make a principled difference between there being one or two of something without also being committed to “brute identity facts” and other such “dank metaphysics” (Ibid., 116). 
The aim of this paper is to explore more carefully Hawley’s notion of “qualitatively significant duplication.” I will argue that even if one grants Hawley’s “ground rule”—that for putative counterexamples to PII, duplication must be qualitatively significant—this requirement is still not sufficient to give a qualitative ground of discernibility between the states of affairs of one and two nonoverlapping indiscernible spheres. Thus, Hawley’s attempt to show how identity facts of distinct indiscernibles can be grounded in purely qualitative criteria without adverting to a PII fails. The result is a general lesson on how to, and how not to, appeal to standards of qualitative discernibility while rejecting PII.
For Hawley, “qualitatively significant duplication” is a duplication of objects that, unlike Della Rocca’s case of indefinitely-many exactly-overlapping objects, makes a qualitative, empirically detectable difference in the arrangement of objects.​[1]​ What is a “qualitative difference”? If the sort of qualitative difference that Hawley appeals to is to do its intended job of letting identity facts be grounded in qualitative facts, I say that it must meet two criteria: (1) one must be able to distinguish it from quantitative difference—a difference that must be marked out in terms of the number of things, and (2) it is a standard that must be equivalent to the qualitative discernibility that plays the deciding role in applications of Leibniz’s Law by differences in qualitative properties. In other words, the following “ground rule” seems appropriate for judging by qualitative discernibility: there is just one kind of criterion called qualitative difference, and changing the rules for its application midstream while still wanting to call it “qualitative difference” is cheating. I say that failing to meet either one of these criteria is sufficient to disqualify a standard of difference from being a case of bona fide qualitative difference, and that Hawley’s appeal to “qualitatively significant duplication” fails both of the criteria.
First, to delineate what qualitative difference must mean as distinguished from quantitative difference. First, it must be noted that there is considerable overlap between the subject matter of the qualitative and the quantitative. A quantitative distinction, unless it is between numbers or pure geometric points, is always of something with qualitative features, and a qualitative distinction always entails a quantitative difference in the number of qualities that are thereby differentiated. Thus, the basic distinction between a qualitative and quantitative ground of discernibility is not simply in whether it is qualitatively or quantitatively “significant,” which doesn’t in itself yield a distinction, but rather in the priority of each involved in making the relevant difference. For example, the difference between blue and purple is certainly qualitative; numerical difference enters into it, but only after we have already distinguished them as two, because nonidentical, because qualitatively discernible, colors. The difference between a blue sphere and a purple sphere—that by which we can tell that they’re not the same thing—is just the same difference as between one blue hemisphere and one purple hemisphere on the same sphere. Qualitative difference is primary to marking out the difference in each case. On the other hand, if you want to tell the difference between a state of affairs with one sphere and that with two indiscernible spheres, the situation is quite different: this time, it is the quantitative difference that is primary. Because of this, differences between the two states of affairs in qualities such as mass and volume and sphericity (if these are qualities) must be stated in terms of the quantitative difference thereof in order to fully specify the universe with two indiscernible spheres. 
It could be countered that duplication need not even be put in terms of objects, so appeal to duplication in itself doesn’t necessarily settle the matter of whether there is one or two things, so one can still make a principled appeal to the qualitative difference between the two states of affairs. But then, it isn’t that the duplication makes for twice as many mutually-discernible qualities, such as twice as many colors: that would be a qualitatively-grounded difference. Rather, to describe the difference between one sphere and two indiscernible spheres, reference to duplication of a thisness (which is supposed to be not thoroughly qualitative) seems indispensable. In contrast, in describing the difference between one sphere and another sphere that is twice its volume but otherwise qualitatively the same, we have a multiplication of qualitative extent relative from one to the other that does not involve duplication of a given thisness. But it is the “same difference” of quantitative duplication that is indispensable, and thus primary, in specifying the state of affairs of two indiscernible spheres, cubes, dodecahedrons, or whatever: the duplication itself is no different in regard to what the thisness is of.
Suppose it is granted that for two indiscernible spheres, quantitative difference is a primary difference-maker, unlike the primary qualitative difference-making involved in a world with two differently-colored spheres. Yet one may wish to try a “back-door” route into the difference involved to see whether the difference between one and two spheres can be judged in a qualitative sense without also smuggling in the quantitative. I say that this will not work. To do this, one needs a (1) complete description of each of the one- and two-sphere worlds, to begin with, and (2) a basis for comparison between the two worlds. One may want to try specifying the total mass in the one- and two-sphere universe, and then note that they differ in the extent of mass present. But this is not sufficient to specify the sphericity of each item in its respective world, which is indeed the very basis for their indiscernibility in this case. Even if we can, in fact, describe a single sphere of certain size and mass, we may be able to leave off at the point of ascribing a thisness to the sphere, if it be thought of as comprised of pure qualities instead. But with two indiscernible spheres, suddenly we cannot leave off this important step: a relation​[2]​ exists between the spheres, by which we know that the two are each a thisness in its own right, and apparently independently of each other; this is exactly the point at which we know that they are two, and moreover distinct, objects. It is this judgment on the two-sphere universe plus the fact that they are indiscernible which is exactly what yields Black’s world in its direct, full-fronted challenge to PII. Now, to compare the two worlds of one sphere and two, we do need the notion of thisnesses to be deployed so that the one-sphere world is equivalent to two spheres with one subtracted from them. Thereby, the one-sphere must also be counted as a thisness, and we are left with the comparison between the two worlds as coming to a quantitative difference of 2 ​​– 1 = 1.
Even if we want to give a name to the shape that is had by the mereological fusion of everything in the two-sphere universe, as long as the spheres have no overlap, this shape it seems can only be specified by qualitatively describing a sphere and then multiplying those same specifications by two: an ineliminably quantitative difference-maker. We would have simply gone from a case of two indiscernible spheres to two indiscernible qualitative specifications of a sphere, which is, as put above, the “same difference.” (Otherwise, the description may as well be of just one sphere with those qualities.) In contrast, for two spheres of different volume, there is a difference in qualitative extent between the two spheres that by itself yields the verdict that there are two things. Granted that sphericity is qualitative, one may want to say of the one-sphere universe that it (or its occupant) is spherical and that the two-sphere universe itself is not. But this mere difference—not being spherical—is also had by a universe with two differently-shaped objects, and thus it is not sufficient to fully describe the difference between the one-sphere and two-sphere states of affairs.
Here is how qualitative differences work in cases of qualitative discernibility. To adapt an example of Adams (1979) to somewhat different use than he put it, consider two almost-indiscernible spheres, which differ only in there being a single gold atom in one sphere where, in its counterpart, there is just another iron atom. The way that one tells that there are two distinct spheres is not by the stipulation that there are two of them, but the fact that they are discernible: the verdict of qualitative difference is primary and leaves no room for doubt, and this is the case whether the two are almost indiscernible, have hardly any properties in common, or anything else in between. The puzzle of distinct indiscernibles does not arise in this case just because the two are in fact discernible, not because we have stipulated that there are two of them. Now change the situation from almost-indiscernibles to perfect indiscernibles. For Adams (ibid.), the apparent ease of this transition served as an intuition pump in favor of the possibility of distinct indiscernibles, but the present point is that the transition removes a qualitative difference, without which one cannot make a principled use of Leibniz’s Law to adjudge distinctness on qualitative grounds.
In the same way, to tell the difference between the states of affairs comprising one sphere and that of two almost-indiscernible spheres, the qualitative difference between the two spheres in the latter state of affairs is what clinches the result that it is not the same state of affairs as the former: one of the states of affairs contains a sphere with a gold atom, and the other state of affairs does not. Again, unlike as in Black’s world, no problems of identity and distinctness arise, and this is just because we have qualitative difference between the two spheres to go on. If qualitative difference is anything, it is this; and if this first criteria for qualitative difference be adopted, as I say it should, it will apply the same way between two discernible spheres as between the two states of affairs of one sphere on the one hand and two discernible spheres on the other. But for telling the difference between one sphere and two indiscernible spheres, “qualitative difference” between the two states of affairs is not primary to the distinction between them, so Hawley cannot advert to a qualitative ground of difference between them in the above-described bona fide senses.
Now for the condition that any case of qualitative difference must share the same distinction from quantitative difference as the above-mentioned application of Leibniz’s Law. Hawley refers to the difference between one sphere and two as “qualitatively significant duplication.” For this measure to be truly qualitative, qualitative distinctions must be primary to its application. But as has already been mentioned, the qualitative difference between one sphere and two—the difference in mass, volume, etc.—is made true just by the fact of duplication. In other words, the difference between the states of affairs can be completely specified by saying that (in Adams’ apt terminology) of a certain suchness, there is either one or two thisnesses. There is only one suchness in either case; the difference is just in the (number of) thisnesses. Thus, the difference between the one-sphere and two-spheres states of affairs may just as well be put as the difference between the number one and the number two, and the two states of affairs are thereby discerned from one another. So, any instance of duplication per se is one for which quantitative difference-making is primary to the distinction. Certainly, the states of affairs comprising one sphere and two are distinguished from one another by use of Leibniz’s Law, after a fashion, but only because of a prior distinction between there being one or two of something, which isn’t a genuinely qualitative ground for identity and distinctness. So because a difference is “qualitatively significant” does not in itself suffice to make it a qualitative ground of distinctness and identity; as long as duplication is of something with some qualitative aspect or other, there’s no question of duplication not being “qualitatively significant.” But the essential thing about duplication is just its quantitative difference-making.
I do not defend Della Rocca’s suggestion that in rejecting PII, one is committed to the possibility of indefinitely-many overlapping objects. I grant Hawley’s point that for any putative counterexample to PII, duplication must be qualitatively significant. One may also unpack this ground rule in the form of a principle that I can also grant, which is that, independently of a PII, one can distinguish between the kind of difference that would be involved between one sphere and indefinitely-many overlapping spheres on the one hand, and the difference between one sphere and Black’s nonoverlapping indiscernibles on the other. In fact, here is a line of thought on behalf of Hawley’s objection and associated ground rule. Consider objects (or, at least, mereological sums) that overlap almost completely. Each weighs 1 kg, but the two of them together do not weigh 2 kg, and this is just because they have a large proper part in common. This proper part is not duplicated; there is just one of it, and one can verify this by weighing and other qualitative measures. Now consider a putative case of complete overlap, and ask Della Rocca’s question: “Why is the one kind of overlap (partial overlap) acceptable and the other kind (complete) not?” (2005, 488–9) Answer: In either case, one verifies that wherever there is overlap, there is no detectable duplication of qualitatively significant features. Based on this uniform criterion, we can tell whether the overlap is complete because in such a case, unlike as in incomplete overlap, there is no qualitatively significant duplication of anything.
But even if insisting on qualitatively significant duplication is a legitimate cry of “foul” to the possibility of indefinitely many completely overlapping spheres, it does not follow that one has a qualitative ground for distinctness and identity. For, as I have argued above, being able to tell the qualitative difference between one and two indiscernible, nonoverlapping spheres does not get one around the necessarily quantitative judgment that there are two rather than one of something: the qualitative difference is secondary to the quantitative one. And this leaves one back with the original dilemma of accepting PII or brute individuation, even if, on independent grounds, one disallows the stipulation of there being multiple exactly-overlapping objects.
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^1	  I take it that Hawley is not necessarily committed to the stronger claim that two indiscernible objects can be individuated on qualitative grounds alone, but merely to the claim that the one-sphere and two-sphere states of affairs are discernible from one another by appeal to qualitative difference alone. It is this claim I take issue with in this paper.
^2	  I say that a relation, in this sense, is sufficient for adjudging the presence of two or more thisnesses that are the relata. And likewise, the presence of two or more objects, thisnesses, in a world, is a necessary condition on there being relations. (I am ignoring for the present pure relations in space, as in Dipert 1997.) More could be said about this, but it would lead us too far afield.
^3	  I thank Michael Della Rocca and two anonymous referees for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.
